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Introduction
1 I my early youth, one of my decisive intellectual experiences has been Gilbert Ryle’s The
Concept of Mind (Ryle 1949). Though I have only faint memories of the topics or the
arguments, the essence of the whole book lied in the vigorous and passionate attack on a
philosopher who had died long ago, a certain René Descartes – a personal and intimate fervor,
as if counting on the quick and vehement reply of the late partner in the debate section of the
next issue of a scholarly journal. I felt a hot commitment in this attitude, a personal concern,
contradicting to all what I had hitherto thought of philosophizing (or „science” in general): I
have been interested in Ryle (and in analytical philosophy, philosophy of language and all its
versions and fields in general) just because I had thought it had been far from all subjectivity,
personal sentiments, opinions and vague suppositions, it was dominated, instead, only by pure
and cool reason, truth and sober argumentation. In this respect, it has been quite strange –
and, strangely enough, sympathetic – the passionate attitude of Ryle: suggesting that scholarly
thinking (at least, in philosophy or, at least, that of Ryle) was not the sterile realm of ideas but
interests and wishes, commitments and distances, attractions and repulsions played part in it.
2 It seems then, and this is what I have realized while reading Ryle, that in certain disciplines
there is no big temporal gap between the old problems and the new ones (and, it seems,
philosophy is such a discipline, and so are literary studies), that is, old questions may elicit
reactions pertaining to the very present. So that the history of these disciplines – or their relation
to their own history – is quite different from other disciplines.
3 Just take two counter-examples. The first is a very simple one: let us place all what happened
to Descartes and Ryle to the field of “real” or “strict” sciences: can we imagine someone
to attack, hundreds of years later, a scholar of high reputation and authority like Descartes
in philosophy, in another field of study? Would we take someone seriously who criticized
the most important figures of the history of science, e.g., Newton or Linné, in the twentieth
century, with harsh words and personal passion? Nonsense. One can only repeat the well
known and now commonplace thesis of Dilthey (1910) that social sciences and natural sciences
are very much different. This is just an element, and not at all the most important one, of
this opposition: namely, that human and natural sciences differ in respect to their history and
historicalness.
4 As another counter-example, consider the other side, treating a very actual, exciting, „hot”
topic with a cool, distanced, detached, reserved tone, looking at it from a historical perspective
– can one do this? Certainly, sometimes it is just our ambition – and it can be definitely
annoying to give up all subjectivity, engagement or personal involvement. Just think of cases
of heated critical discussions where, instead of argumentation, one of the parties just judges
and contextualizes the arguments, pretending to be a bystander, an observer or historian, and
not a participant.
5 This behavior is, in itself, a style of warfare, of course – changing the position, even if
temporarily and seemingly, secures the illusion of invulnerability; just as the opposite step (that
is, choosing, instead of a descriptive, distanced, „objective” position, the passionate, devoted,
hot-tempered debate) is also a manner of war. If it is true, cannot we simply regard these
versions as simple rhetorical tricks, mere verbal ploys by which we want to call the attention to
our own arguments, or trying to captivate the sympathy of the reader? That is, should we take
these shifts seriously, the change of positions between discussing or analyzing, participating
or observing, does it have any significance, beyond rhetoric?
6 So let us turn back to the first counter-example: what I tried to show was that natural and
human sciences differ also in the respect that their relation to their own history is very much
different. If it is true then choosing the position itself may be part of this peculiarity. That is,
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it is hard to imagine that in a discourse (or debate) in the realm of natural sciences one of the
participants decides to take a point of view of the history of science, or that a historian of the
science decides to start arguing with the subject of his own narrative.
7 The history of science, as is known from the history of natural sciences and especially from
the historical model of paradigm changes of Kuhn (1962), is a succession of closed, completed
periods. An era will replace the former one by rendering it of mere historical interest: its issues
are not issues of a discussion any more, it is not our interest to argue for or against any of the
standpoints which were important in the past. In this respect, it ceases to be interesting – only
inasmuch as the history of science means some interest. In the humanities, this is different:
one could say that whatever we touch of the texts of the past, we can form a vivid, disputant,
interpretive relation with them, from Plato to the present day. The situation may be somewhat
more complicated, and it is an exciting question why this or that period, thinker or school of
thought is regarded as something worth addressing (or regarded as addressing us).
8 So it deserves a short glance what is revived, why and by whom. Think, for example, of
Positivism – who cares about it? Is it interesting? And if it is, why and for whom? There
was a time, decades ago, when in university education it seemed very important to make the
students understand what Positivist methods, principles and individual scholars were in order
to formulate deep criticism against them, to disqualify them (and, in certain respects, evaluate
and appreciate them). However, there has not been a similar ambition to re-evaluate and re-
interpret New Criticism or Impressionistic Criticism – just check the difference between the
scholarly literature devoted to them. Structuralism, again, is a chapter in the history of human
sciences which has remained very long on the agenda (presumably for different reasons), and
it reoccurs again and again, its history itself is rewritten from time to time.
9 To repeat the consequence, in our field cultivating „history of the sciences” is in fact not at
all (or only rarely, in exceptional cases) a historical sort of study: that is, it is not an analysis
of closed, completed periods but rather raising, again, older questions. Just as the example of
Ryle shows, it is not the case that whatever has passed is closed forever, and our interest is
only of a historical kind, but we may be engaged in it, and it is our desire to convince our
audience that we have something to do with all this old stuff. Another example from another
field is Freud: psychoanalysis has a history of its own, there is an enormous amount of texts
dealing with the lives, cases, works and practices of Freud and his successors. However, there
are, up to the present day, a number of works which feverishly criticize, more than a hundred
years later, psychoanalysis in its entirety or in parts, giving new interpretations or seeking for
new answers or new questions. Such a situation could not happen in the history of biology or
chemistry. Moreover it can be suspected that the history of the science – in this case, that of
psychoanalysis – is not just an innocent and objective description of happenings of the past
(or views held long ago). Maybe not in all cases, but often we may have the impression that
this „history” was born with the intention to teach a lesson for the present, or at least counting
on an interest for the distances, objective account. If I am not mistaken, Pierre-Yves Raccah
(2005) argues in a similar vein when he warns that „the so called ‘natural laws’ should be
interpreted as possible constants of the human cognitive systems, or as relating the human
cognitive system to the world we observe, but not as properties of that world alone”.
2. Turning Point as a Construct
10 Whenever we look for a turning point in the history of human sciences, we must be aware of
the fact that marking off such a point, or an important event (an author, a work etc.) in our
field is far from being an ever valid, impartial, objective act; naming a period (or an author, a
work, a theory etc.) a turning point is, in fact, an activity by which we not only write (or re-
write) the history of the human sciences but it also counts as a contribution to the scholarship
of our own present. Partly indirectly, since we have in our mind a certain idea of the science,
an idea of history, a notion of conceptual purity or opaqueness, etc. – and partly directly,
for we would wish to call the attention to some moral, some aspect worth considering, some
effective argument. Stating, for instance, that Positivism was a turning point in literary studies,
we necessarily imply a sort of ideal of scholarly thinking, and we raise, again, the problem
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of facts – independent of the question how far it is well-founded, legitimate or, moreover,
historically correct.
11 To put it in a somewhat other way, the term „turn” refers to something like saying that after a
certain „event” something is not like it was before that event. These „events” are pretty difficult
to discover in the history of literary, linguistic (or any other human) studies, but still we use
the term rather bravely. And if we do, we must face at least two questions: the first is how we
justify this change (the turn or sharp difference between before and after), and, second, why
we choose just this or that special event as a turn (what this choice witnesses, what it shows
of our preferences, interests, world view).
3. Systems Theory as a Turn
12 If my choice is system theoretical approaches or schools (of literary studies, for instance), then
(first) I must give account of why I see something interesting in this trend (if it is one trend); if it
is important, then it has something to do with our present questions, either as relevant questions
or relevant replies – in any case, there should be a possibility of dialogue in that school(s). And
(second) all what I have said above has been formulated in terms of systems approaches, it
could not have been written independent of the considerations of systemic thinking of human
sciences.
13 Take the example of literary studies. They are not necessarily interested, in the first place,
in what, how and why should be interpreted – more exactly: there are several rival trends in
literary studies, some foregrounding just these problems (what is a text? why do we call a text
literary? how is this quality recognized? what does the reader do with a literary text, and is she
right?). In these trends the object of the inquiry is the literary text (its structure, for instance),
and the receiver, perhaps the writer, and it is intentionally (and with a good reason) limited to
the text and its interpretation, refraining from whatever is non-literary, which does not belong
to the area of literature proper. Structuralism is about the structure of the text and does not
wish to step out of this circle. But the trends which I label systematic here would challenge the
beatific quality of this line of inquiry. It is not the case that systems theory would „surpass”
Structuralism, that is, I am not implying any evolutionary process here: but it offers another
perspective, and invites us to rethink old, outdated points of view which has been regarded as
alien to the essence of literature.
14 I have two examples – none of these authors would call themselves proponents of the
systemic approach but they can be characterized by a line of thought which leads away from
Structuralism towards various trends which can be subsumed under this label. More than thirty
years ago Jonathan Culler reviewed what else, what more important and interesting things
could have been done than merely analyzing texts – as it had been formed, by New Criticism,
an almost obligatory and exclusive practice. His essay (entitled „Beyond Interpretation”) is an
introductory chapter of a book (Culler 1981), so it just quickly flashes some of the trends which
might have been promising and surpassing text analysis – from the social determination of
literature (represented by the Marxist Jameson) through the deconstructive potential within the
texts (Derrida, de Man, Hillis Miller) to the schools concentrating on the multiplicity of texts,
their interconnections, histories, genres and intertextual connections. That is, extrapolating the
writing of Culler, one could step out of the narrow place of text / reader, towards systems.
The other author is Siegfried J. Schmidt (Schmidt 1991) who (himself and the members of his
school entitled Empirical Literary Studies) reviewed the whole system where literature works
with a mathematical rigor (where literary system is just a subsystem of the whole system of
society complying to special rules corresponding to it); on the other hand, strangely enough,
they celebrate non-systematic, chaotic, free and uncontrolled behavior whenever it comes to
interpretation (the central saint of the Structuralist schools). That is, this systems theoretical
approach gives way to “literary erotic”, since interpretation itself challenges all rules, and it
cannot be described according to strict rules.
15 As of the late sixties, very different but in their ambitions and certain principles rather similar
schools and trends appeared on the scene. One could perhaps try to tell this story as that of the
decay of Structuralism, its decomposition – still, the situation is much more complex.
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16 First, there were trends which the historians of Structuralism were happy to classify as
parts of Structuralism – however, they became, quite easily, parts of the systems theoretical
approaches. This can be another example that writing the history of science is not an objective
and innocent activity, but through its classification (ignoring or incorporating) the possible
questions it in fact shapes this history. When Todorov discovered Russian Formalism for the
French Structuralism (Todorov 1965), and posited a continuity between the two, it amounted
to an interpretation of the theoreticians (who could of course be interpreted in several other
ways). If Éjxenbaum and Tinjanov became parts of the great Structuralist canon, from the
sixties, there may come a reinterpretation (which in fact did come) to foreground their systems
theoretical characteristics.
17 Second, some trends which can be connected to the systems theoretical schools had no relation
whatsoever with Structuralism – they did not grow out of Structuralism, either are they its
negations or decomposition products. One may speculate a lot on the connection between
Structuralism and Bourdieu, Schmidt or Luhmann (either personally, or institutionally, or in
their principles) but what is certain is that neither of them is a typical renegade or Oedipal
figure. Of course, these schools have a lot to thank to Structuralism (as in the twentieth century
it was inevitable to reflect on it, either as opposing or supporting it).
18 Third, there are trends opposing to Structuralism (or passing by it, but in their principles could
have been opponents), but without any connection to systems theoretical studies. Reception
aesthetics or the new Hermeneutics (the first is referred to by Culler) are in several respects
anti-Structuralist trends, however, they do not have too much to do with systematic approaches.
So a simple, linear narrative without several subplots cannot be formed – and this is the
moral of my three points above: however tempting it could be, the story of „the decay of
Structuralism” cannot be written.
19 So what are the trends which could be regarded as turning points, and what are the
characteristics of this turn? The New Paradigm which Schmidt has heralded seems to come
to a dead end, Empirical Literary Studies have been covered, contrary to the founders'
intentions, by minute empirical case studies of psychology, sociology, reading research etc.,
and the theoretical foundation does seem to offer enough armory for the historical, textual or
intertextual work. Strangely enough, the journal Poetics which used to be the periodical of the
school turned towards the sociology of Bourdieu (and there has always been a contact between
the French scholar and the German trend). There has been another initiative for a school, the
Polysystem Theory of the excellent Israeli scholar, proponent and pioneer of the trend, Itamar
Even-Zohar (1990). However, this seems to be somewhat gone out of breath: in a way, it
contributed to its own problems through turning to the whole field of culture where literature
is but a minor, negligible sub-field and receives little attention. Quite differentase of Bourdieu
who has not been interested in the phenomenon of literature for a long time, only inasmuch as
it was one of the symbolic goods – then, in his fantastic book on Flaubert (Bourdieu 1992), he
offers a lot of lessons to learn, methodological as well as historical, for the student of literature,
language, sociology, history, all what Bourdieu says elsewhere on culture and society is also
worth considering.
20 The systemic approach to (or systems theory of) literature (or humanities in general) is, then,
not in fact ready, completed, it could and should be put together from these very precious
spare parts (and here I mention Luhmann again who wishes to describe the whole society in
a systems theoretical way, and Habermas who treats the interconnection of communication
and society in an extremely exciting way). The common element, in my opinion, is perhaps
that such an inquiry would posit the process of producing, mediating and consuming texts
within the structure and history of society; it would contemplate texts as operating in a given
system which has its own participants, agents having different functions, roles, which can
be (according to interests or constraints) changed, from time to time. It is such a change in
function when a critic turns into a historian or a historian a disputant, a change referred to
in my introduction. These systems are interwoven by subordinations and oppressions, power
fights, interests and attractions, just as anything working in the society; these relations will
then influence on the interpretations of texts (literary or other), how they are received or talked
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about, under what circumstances. And this is as important factor of understanding texts as the
description of their inherent structure. Or, to put it even more sharply, we would not care about
the structure of the texts, were there no certain social and historical determinations forcing us
to do so. Something like this could constitute the core element of a systems approach, followed
by a number of logical and historical rules, observations and data.
4. Conclusion: the Actuality of Systemic Research
21 In conclusion, if I said that regarding something as a turning point is not so much a proposition
of the turning point itself but rather refers to those who pronounce this sentence, then why I
consider this trend, even if it is not a complete one, as a very important one? In what does its
interesting nature, linking it to the present, lie, which would justify its outstanding position?
In my view, just because it does not seem to be too fashionable, it is not in the course of
forming, not in motion, it is, in several respects, came to a stand, stopped, intermittent – there
is a possibility, potentiality in it, a promise of work. As I see, all what has been started some
thirty years ago will give us tasks even today.
22 Just take some very concrete examples, pertaining to our present. How and who form literary
historical thinking today? Through what channels will the ideological influence of the power
is realized on the shaping of literary life, education, market? How did it look like earlier?
What historical continuity can we find in certain interpretations, how and by whom are they
bequeathed, and what about the position of non-canonic texts in the system? Questions like
these could be enumerated endlessly, and they are often treated and replied – but there may be a
demand to build up the system of the systemic approaches in a systematic way in the scholarly
community. Today, I see much more potential, relevant to a wider range of the scholarly field,
and to several field of the human sciences, than in analyzing the structure of the texts or the
characteristics of reception or their history.
23 Since what I have said is about meanings (though mostly meanings of literary texts), let me
finish with quoting a part of Raccah's conclusion:
Meaning in natural languages can be the object of an empirical science, if it is considered as
the constraints, invariant across utterances, under which the interpretation is built by the hearers,
keeping in mind that interpretations are only indirectly observable and that, of course, constraints
on them require even more theoretical work in order to be indirectly observed1. (Raccah 2005)
24 Moving from the utterance to the hearer and the whole system within which it operates is a
tempting ad fruitful act.
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Résumés
 
In certain disciplines there is no big temporal gap between the old problems and the new ones:
old questions may elicit reactions pertaining to the very present. Natural and human sciences
differ in the respect that their relation to their own history is different. In the humanities,
cultivating „history of the sciences” is in fact not at all a historical study: that is, it is not an
analysis of closed, completed periods but rather raising, again, older questions. Marking off
a turning point here is far from being an ever valid, impartial, objective act; naming a period
(or an author, a work, a theory etc.) a turning point is, in fact, an activity by which we not
only write (or re-write) the history of the human sciences but it also counts as a contribution
to the scholarship of our own present; regarding something as a turning point is not so much a
proposition of the turning point itself but rather refers to those who pronounce this sentence. I
regard system theoretical approaches or schools as such a turning point and argue that it is not
a story of the decay of Structuralism, its decomposition: the systemic approach to (or systems
theory of) literature (or humanities in general) is, then, not in fact ready, completed, it could and
should be put together from very precious spare parts; such an inquiry would posit the process
of producing, mediating and consuming texts within the structure and history of society; it
would contemplate texts as operating in a given system which has its own participants, agents
having different functions, roles.
 
Dans certaines disciplines, il n'y a pas de grand écart temporel entre les problèmes anciens
et nouveaux: les vieilles questions peuvent provoquer des réactions qui rentrent au présent.
La différence principale entre les sciences de la nature et les sciences humaines réside dans
la caractéristique de la relation de chacune avec sa propre histoire. Cultiver «l’histoire des
sciences» dans le domaine des sciences humaines ne signifie pas du tout l’étude historique
ou l’analyse des périodes historiques passées, mais consiste dans la capacité de reformuler les
vieilles questions. Marquer un point tournant est loin d'être un acte impartial ou bien objectif
à l’ambition d’être toujours valide. La désignation d’une période historique ou d’un auteur
ou bien d’une théorie (etc.) - en tant qu’événement qui marque une orientation nouvelle ou
un changement important - n’est pas de décrire (ou réécrire) tout simplement l’histoire des
sciences humaines, mais de contribuer à un niveau général à l’essor de la science de notre
propre présent. Quand on marque un tournant, un moment ou un événement à partir duquel
le cours des choses peut changer de direction, on évoque toujours ceux qui ont proposé ce
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changement. Dans cette communication je propose de considérer les approches des écoles
et/ou des systèmes théoriques comme tournants, et je pars de l’hypothèse que l’approche
systémique n’est guère obsolète. L’approche systémique ne représente pas donc un moment de
l’histoire de la désintégration ou de la chute du structuralisme, mais cette approche se distingue
des autres par sa façon de pouvoir mettre ensemble des différentes parties analysées dans la
perspective de cette démarche. Comment le processus de production, de consommation et de
la médiation de textes peut générer du sens au sein de la structure de la société et de l'histoire ?
Voilà la vraie question. Nous nous demandons : dans quel système, dans quel contexte les
textes littéraires sont influencés par ses propres participants et ses agents ayant des fonctions
et des rôles différents.
Entrées d’index
Mots-clés : histoire des sciences humaines; objectivité; points tournants; théories de
système; structuralisme; théorie de la littérature
Keywords :  history of human sciences; turning points; objectivity; systems theory;
structuralism; literary theory;
